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1 Introduction
The place of business in the United Nations has
always been somewhat ambiguous. To be sure, the
United Nations is an organisation of governments,
where in principle private entities have no
standing; the only exception is the International
Labour Organization (ILO), whose formal
governance structure includes governments, trade
unions and employer organisations.
From the start, however, the United Nations
sought to engage non-state actors in its work.1
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had
taken up consultative status at the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) as early as 1946, and
currently there are some 3,900 entities in that
category, which extends to all subsidiary bodies
of ECOSOC. Organisations with consultative
status include international, regional and
national NGOs, and non-profit public and
voluntary organisations; the status entitles them
to attend UN meetings and conferences, propose
agenda items, circulate written statements and
make oral statements if specifically authorised to
do so.2
None of this, however, applies to business
enterprises. While employer organisations are
eligible for consultative status, individual
companies are not. And yet, it is evident that
business can play a major role in the pursuance
– or the defeat – of international goals that are a
central part of the United Nations mandate;
some that immediately spring to mind are the
protection of human rights and the
environment, the fight against poverty and
against corruption, and the achievement of
economic and social development. These roles of
business have been of growing importance in the
last two decades, both because UN goals have
achieved a widespread consensus among
governments and because business and
multinational corporations have themselves
grown in influence and impact in more and
more countries of the world.
By the same token, many United Nations
initiatives and actions are of interest to the
private business sector, inasmuch as they may
affect their mode of operation and in the end
their profitability. Executives of private firms are
routinely included in national delegations to
negotiating fora, particularly by developed
countries; companies sometimes lobby meetings
and delegations, as well as Secretariats, in some
instances with great impact.3
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Moreover, the operational and funding agencies of
the United Nations have long been purchasers and
partners with individual firms and as such they
have a capacity to exert influence on the behaviour
of a number of businesses and corporations; this is
especially so in the areas of health and
pharmaceutical production and marketing.
It is therefore not surprising that in the last
decade and a half there have been sustained
efforts on the part of the United Nations to bring
the business sector, and specifically individual
companies, into more formal arrangements for
discussion and cooperation; and to codify the
policies of the United Nations vis-à-vis business to
give the relationship a more structured footing.
This article will review some of the most
prominent of those efforts, to assess their degree
of success and explore the issues they raise in
connection with both the achievement of United
Nations goals and with the manner in which
United Nations governance is evolving.
In particular, it will evaluate the available
evidence about the extent to which they are
achieving the aim of mobilising the skills and
resources of private business for the furtherance
of the goals of the United Nations. It will further
address some of the main concerns raised by the
UN–business interface, namely, is the
relationship with the United Nations essentially
a means for business to gain public legitimacy?
Can it become a vehicle for business to influence
United Nations policies and actions? How
effective is self-regulation as an approach to the
governance of the relationship?
2 The new modes of engagement and the issues
UN–business relationships have developed into a
wide array of different types. Within them five
basic modes of engagement can be distinguished:
1 Enlisting the cooperation of business in
achieving fundamental international goals;
2 Developing value-oriented norms and
standards applicable to both governments and
business with a view to preventing violations
of the fundamental goals;
3 Developing technical standards in
international production and trade;
4 Providing venues for dialogue and the exchange
of information and views among governments,
private business companies and civil society; and
5 Where applicable, exercising market power to
influence the prices and availability of goods
and services so as to maximise their
development impact.
All of them – in different ways and to different
degrees – raise some common issues.4 A first
issue has to do with measuring the impact of the
engagements. Here the familiar nomenclature of
the results-based management framework is
helpful (see UNDP 2002). It distinguishes
activities, outputs (completed activities), outcomes
(intermediate effects) and impact (longer run
effects); the categories are not rigidly delimited,
and there are overlaps. As will be seen below, the
assessment of impact varies as among the above
four meanings and among the five modes of
engagement described.
A second issue has to do with the voluntary
character of the engagements and the
consequent absence of mechanisms for enforcing
and, in some cases, even monitoring compliance.
There is a criticism that this substantially
diminishes the possibility of the schemes having
real impact and indeed opens up the possibility
of the existence of voluntary schemes being used
by business as an argument to prevent or at least
delay the introduction of binding arrangements
(the ‘self-regulation’ issue).
A third issue stems also from the voluntary
character of the engagements, and is a question
of the extent to which companies could in effect
use their association with the UN to enhance
their reputation without changing their
corporate behaviour (the ‘bluewash’ issue).
Finally, there is the question as to whether
participation in the various schemes provides
business with the opportunity to influence UN
policy thinking on corporate social responsibility
(CSR), international trade and foreign direct
investment in ways consistent with business
interests (the ‘capture’ issue).
In the next section we provide a brief description
of a selected number of initiatives chosen in
terms of their potential impact on the goals of
the UN and on its governance arrangements.
The subsequent section will explore the issues
raised as they apply to the different kinds of
UN–business engagements.
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3 The main initiatives
3.1 Engaging the cooperation of business
The United Nations Global Compact. The
flagship initiative under this heading is the
United Nations Global Compact promoted by
the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and
launched in July 2000. While primarily addressed
to business, it also includes governments, labour
and civil society organisations, with the UN as
convenor and facilitator. The Compact involves a
commitment from business to align operations
and strategies with ten principles in the areas of
human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption.5 It also involves a commitment to
engage in a structured dialogue with all other
stakeholders about what is deemed to constitute
good practice, the ‘learning network’ element
(Ruggie 2001; Knight 2002; see also Rasche and
Kell 2010; Fritsch 2008; Whitehouse 2003); and a
willingness to join the UN in partnership
projects to benefit developing countries.
Currently there are some 12,000 participants, of
which 8,000 are companies, in 145 countries
(United Nations Global Compact 2014; Rasche,
Waddock and McIntosh 2013 includes a
comprehensive bibliography on the Compact).
A central feature of the Global Compact is that
it does not entail legally binding commitments.
The Compact’s web page emphasises that ‘it is
not a regulatory instrument but rather a
voluntary initiative that relies on public
accountability, transparency and disclosure to
complement regulation and to provide a space
for innovation and collective action’ (United
Nations Global Compact 2014).
The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) Business Call to Action. This was
launched in 2008. It is described as ‘a global
initiative that seeks to harness the power of
business investments to reduce extreme poverty
and improve the lives of millions… by challenging
companies to develop inclusive business models
that offer the potential for both commercial
success and development impact’ (UNDP n.d.).
As of 2014 the initiative comprised 89 companies
from Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, the US,
Brazil, India, the Philippines and Turkey.
Company commitments span the areas of green
technology, agriculture, financial services, health
and sanitation and include providing 1.8 million
jobs, vocational training for 3 million people, and
improving nutrition for 1.2 million people
(Business Call to Action n.d.).6, 7
3.2 Developing value-oriented norms and standards
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights. Endorsed by the UN Human
Rights Council in June 2011, these are described
in the Interpretive Guide issued by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights as ‘the global
standard of practice that is now expected of all
States and businesses with regard to business
and human rights’ (OHCHR 2012: 1).
The Principles are based on a framework
proposed by Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General Professor John Ruggie which
identifies three pillars for state and business
duties in connection with human rights: Protect,
Respect, Remedy. The Principles, 31 in all, are
divided between those addressed to states and
those addressed to business.
The Guiding Principles are, again, not legally
binding in themselves, but ‘elaborate on the
implications of existing standards and practices
for States and businesses, and include points
covered variously in international and domestic
law’ (OHCHR 2012: 1).
There is clearly a certain degree of overlap
between the Guiding Principles and the Global
Compact, and this has been clarified by a joint
statement (United Nations Global Compact and
OHCHR 2011).
Other efforts of this sort include the ILO
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
adopted by the Governing Body of the ILO in
November 1977 and the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Children’s Rights
and Business Principles developed by UNICEF,
the UN Global Compact and Save the Children
(UNICEF n.d.a).
The World Health Organization (WHO)/UNICEF
International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk
Substitutes. This was adopted in 1981 by the
World Health Assembly. Its purpose is to protect
breastfeeding against unethical marketing
practices of the breast milk substitute industry.
The Code contains, among others, prohibitions
to advertise breast milk substitutes, to give free
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Box 1 The UN using its own market power
The UN Funds and Specialized Agencies spend several billions of dollars each year in
support of health, education, water and sanitation services and investments, often directed
to children and vulnerable groups living in rural or peri-urban areas. Although the sums
involved are considerably less than those expended by the World Bank and the Regional
Development Banks and by aid donors in direct support of governments, the leverage of
UN expenditure has often been used to promote low-cost, people-focused approaches with
pioneering effects in terms of new technologies, prices and market operations.
One clear example was in the early 1970s, when UNICEF was widely engaged in drilling
tube wells in India and installing a variety of hand pumps, many of inadequate cast-iron
design. After evidence showed a very high rate of breakdown, UNICEF worked with Indian
engineers and manufacturers to develop what became the Indian Mark II hand pump,
which was low cost, sturdy and reliable but easily repairable, suitable for installing in
villages with deep tube wells. It was initially designed so that a local village mechanic could
easily make the repair, with later modifications consciously designed so that village women,
the main users, could manage the maintenance and repair themselves. Initially, UNICEF
itself directly supported manufacture, but by 1984 hand pump production had become an
established industry, with over 60 local manufacturers producing 300,000 hand pumps a
year, many for export; UNICEF then moved to standardisation, quality control and
purchase. To date, over four million Indian Mark II hand pumps have been manufactured
and installed, widely in Asia and Africa.
For its immunisation campaigns, UNICEF with WHO also encouraged the development of
equipment and supplies suitable for use in the rural areas of poorer countries, for instance
non-reusable syringes, vaccines more tolerant to tropical temperatures or not requiring the
use of a cold chain for delivery. In recent years, these activities have also found support
from Gavi and the Gates Foundation.
An impressive example of using market power with widespread effects was the Danish-
supported programme for supplying essential drugs to rural health clinics in Tanzania. An
open system of competitive bidding for the supply of a core list of 32 basic medicines was used.
This resulted in a substantial reduction of costs, some 40 per cent below what was anticipated.
UNICEF and WHO began to issue quarterly price lists based on these prices, recommending
governments elsewhere to use them as guidelines for their own supplies and, if not available,
they could obtain supplies at these prices direct from UNICEF.
Although, again, the sums involved in these purchases may be small compared to the
global market of pharmaceutical products, the focused purchases by the UN of products for
use in poorer countries has often encouraged the companies to develop low-cost supplies
(and low-cost solutions) better adapted to the conditions in poorer countries. The level of
mass purchase is usually beyond the reach of individual small and poorer countries acting
alone. This was true in the early days of HIV/AIDS when UNICEF and WHO, with the
support of many NGOs, pressured companies to lower prices of anti-retroviral drugs many
times below those they were charging in developed countries.
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samples of breast milk substitutes to mothers
and to promote breast milk substitutes in health-
care facilities.
The Code itself was adopted as a
Recommendation and therefore is not legally
binding by itself. However, Art. 24 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child has been
interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of
the Child as requiring governments to take
steps to implement it through national legislation.
The most recent report on the status of
implementation of the Code (UNICEF 2011)
shows that 81 countries had enacted legislation
or other legal measures encompassing all or
many provisions, while 30 others had adopted a
few provisions or most of them on a voluntary
basis. Countries are often under considerable
pressure from companies which manufacture
breast milk substitutes not to adopt the Code or
to make exceptions to some of its provisions, a
point we come back to below.
3.3 Developing technical standards
One activity stands out here: Codex
Alimentarius. The Codex Alimentarius
Commission, established by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WHO in
1963, develops harmonised international food
standards, guidelines and codes of practice.
According to its Statute its purpose is ‘protecting
the health of the consumers and ensuring fair
practices in the food trade’ (Art. 1(a)). As of 2014
it comprises 186 Codex Members – 185 Member
Countries and one Member Organisation (EU) –
and 224 Codex Observers, of which 52 are
intergovernmental organisations, 157 are NGOs
and 15 are UN organisations (WHO/FAO n.d.).
The Codex standards are not binding but rather
recommendations to the members for voluntary
application. In effect, however, they are very
widely applied, and in many cases have served as
a basis for national legislation and regulation.
Furthermore, the Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the
World Trade Organization has given the Codex a
measure of legal status in its dispute settlement
process (WTO 1994).
This has led to the private business sector
becoming very interested in taking part in the
work of the Commission and particularly of its
technical subsidiary bodies. While individual
companies are not eligible for observer status,
they are often included in national delegations;
furthermore, business associations can be
observers, and they have a strong presence in
meetings and activities generally.8
3.4 Providing venues for dialogue
The United Nations Conference on Trade
Development (UNCTAD) World Investment
Forum is a biennial event designed to facilitate
dialogue, and eventually action, among the main
actors in the world’s investment economy
(UNCTAD 2014).
In the 2014 Forum, speakers included 43
representatives of governments, 58 high
executives of international business companies,
including 29 CEOs, and representatives of
19 stock exchanges. Discussions covered a wide
range of topics, including: Investing in
Sustainable and Universal Access to Medicines:
Local Production in Developing Countries;
Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality –
the Role of Transnational Corporations (TNCs);
Human Rights and Investment Policy Making:
Relevance and Integration; Making Value Chains
Work for the Poor; Reforming the International
Investment Agreements Regime.
3.5 Exercising market power
UNICEF/WHO and the pricing of
pharmaceuticals. As major purchasers of
essential drugs and other products in sizable
quantities, UNICEF and WHO have used their
market power to reduce substantially the prices
of pharmaceutical products, for instance essential
supplies for clinics and anti-retroviral drugs. Such
actions have achieved extended impact by
publishing and disseminating the lower prices
achieved and encouraging developing countries to
use them for their own purchases (see Box 1).
4 Back to the issues
4.1 Measuring impact
How do the selected initiatives perform in the
light of the issues identified in Section 2 above?
On the issue of impact, a common feature is the
indeterminacy as far as the ultimate effects are
concerned. As has been suggested in an evaluation
of the Global Compact – but applicable to the
other efforts – the ultimate goal is ‘promoting
inclusive globalisation’ (McKinsey & Company
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2004: 1). The evaluation goes on to state that ‘an
attempt to assess the Compact’s impact on the
ultimate goal of promoting inclusive globalisation
would have been spurious, given the many
variables that affect it’ (McKinsey & Company
2004: 1–2).9 In the very nature of this broad goal it
is simply not possible to assess the success or
otherwise of the endeavours.
By contrast, when it comes to activities and
outputs, some assessment is possible, and it is, on
the whole, a favourable one. Figures have been
quoted above of the number of companies
responding to the various demarches for
engagement, and they are by and large
impressive. So are activities and outputs in
pursuance of the programmes, whether they are
network meetings, workshops, webinars and
newsletters in the case of the Global Compact
(see as an example, Global Compact Network
United Kingdom 2014); the launching of projects
under the UNDP Business Call to Action
(Business Call to Action 2013, n.d.); the work on
implementation of the Guiding Principles by the
Working Group on Business and Human Rights
(Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
n.d.) and by a number of governments,
intergovernmental organisations and
international NGOs (Ruggie 2014); the number
of standards produced by the Codex Alimentarius
(339; see WHO/FAO 2014) and by the Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) (118; see
UNECE n.d.b); the Interagency Roundtables on
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the
Global CSR Retreats organised by UNCTAD.
The jury, however, is still out on whether the
main outcome sought – influencing the actual
behaviour of business in strategic and
fundamental areas such as furthering human
rights, the protection of the environment and
development – is being achieved.
The issue is particularly relevant for the Global
Compact. An early – but still the only –
systematic effort at evaluating its outcomes
(McKinsey & Company 2004) concluded that, on
balance, there was a positive effect. The study
finds that the Global Compact has had
noticeable, incremental impact on companies,
the UN, governments and other civil society
actors and has built a strong base for future
results. The Compact has primarily accelerated
policy change in companies, while catalysing a
proliferation of ‘partnership projects’,
development-oriented activities that companies
undertake with UN agencies and other partners
(McKinsey & Company 2004: 2).
This positive conclusion, however, is tempered by
the recognition that ‘inconsistent participation
and divergent and unmet expectations limit the
impact on companies and continue to threaten
the Compact’s long-term credibility with
participants’ (McKinsey & Company 2004: 2).
The point has been subsequently confirmed by
an exercise carried out since 2007 by the
Compact itself, the Global Compact Annual
Implementation Survey.10 The Survey probes
essentially into activities and outputs rather than
outcomes or impact. Even at this level, however,
it acknowledges problems. On the basis of the
2012 Survey, the Compact’s 2013 Global
Corporate Sustainability Report states that:
Survey findings point to a clear gap between
the ‘say’ and ‘do’ steps of the Global Compact
Management Model. Companies are making
commitments, defining goals and setting
policies at high rates, but still have much work
to do to [sic] on the action steps: implement,
measure and communicate. For example, while
65 per cent of signatories are committing to
sustainability at the CEO level, only 35 per
cent are training managers to integrate
sustainability into strategy and operations
(United Nations Global Compact 2013: 7).
Compact officials and sympathetic commentators
have emphasised that any effort at evaluating the
impact of the initiative should take into account
the learning function of the Compact. Some
analysts have gone as far as to suggest that the
main contribution of the Compact lies in
exemplifying a new form of governance, ‘a new
set of international practices that has been
referred to as “complex multilateralism… the
Compact is a striking manifestation of this
evolution toward a bottom-up, nonhierarchical
model of multilateral cooperation”’ (Thérien and
Pouliot 2006: 57; see also Fritsch 2008). We shall
come back to this assessment below in connection
with the ‘capture’ issue; it has been argued that
the learning network approach compounds it
inasmuch as the weight of business in the
networks could be disproportionate to that of
NGOs and other participants.
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4.2 Self-regulation
The question of impact is closely related to the
debate about self-regulation as a mode of
governance of the relationship between the UN
and business. Reference has already been made
to the view that this is essentially an ineffectual
mechanism, and one that might in fact be
counterproductive inasmuch as it might provide
arguments against the adoption of binding,
monitorable and enforceable international
commitments.11 The opposing view is that
contemporary civil regulation is fundamentally
different from traditional industry self-
regulation: while the latter is typically
exclusively governed and controlled by firms, the
governance of civil regulations is more likely to
be transparent, contested, and to either formally
or informally involve stakeholders outside the
firm (Vogel 2010: 70). It has been further argued
that any realistic assessment of civil regulation
should compare it not to an ideal world of
effective global economic governance but to
actual policy alternatives.
When compared to most government
regulations in developed countries, civil
regulation is clearly less effective… But the
effectiveness of civil regulations is roughly
comparable to that of many
intergovernmental treaties and agreements,
whose effectiveness in addressing
environmental protection, labour practices,
and human rights is also mixed and uneven
(Vogel 2010: 80).
The issue of self-regulation has been hotly
debated in connection with the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights. It will
be recalled that in 2003 a Sub-Commission of the
UN Commission on Human Rights had adopted
a set of norms on the responsibilities of TNCs
and other business enterprises with regard to
human rights. The norms constituted a ‘non-
voluntary’, comprehensive framework, creating
direct obligations for TNCs and supplemented by
a rigid enforcement mechanism including the
monitoring by non-state actors (NGOs and TNCs
themselves).
The norms were approved by the Sub-
Commission despite strong opposition from
business and from many governments, including
of developing countries. The Commission itself
did not adopt them and instead asked the UN
Secretary General to appoint a Special
Representative to review the whole matter of
corporations and human rights. In July 2005,
Professor John Ruggie was appointed as the
Special Representative and went on to propose
the Guiding Principles three years later.12
A main argument of governments against the
norms was that they departed from the existing
frameworks of international law by attempting to
impose duties and obligations on non-state
actors, while these were applicable solely to
states (Miretski and Bachmann 2012: 33).
Professor Ruggie did not take the view that
companies cannot be bearers of duties under
international law, but felt they cannot have the
same range of duties as states. He further felt
that the conditions were not ripe for a binding
international instrument.
As a result, and as already indicated, the 
Guiding Principles are not – and are not
intended to be – legally binding in themselves.
Although some are addressed directly at
business, they are not justiciable as far as
business is concerned. This did not satisfy NGOs
and activists who insisted on having a legally
binding instrument that would establish specific
obligations for companies.13
The issue was taken up by a group of countries
(Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, South Africa and
Venezuela) which proposed a resolution to the
UN Human Rights Council which establishes an
open-ended intergovernmental working group
with the mandate to elaborate an international
legally binding instrument on TNCs and other
business enterprises with respect to human
rights (UN Human Rights Council 2014). It was
adopted by a vote of 20 in favour, 14 against and
13 abstentions; all OECD countries voted against
and all Latin American countries, except for
Cuba and Venezuela, abstained.14 Countries
voting against argued that the proposed
intergovernmental group would create a
competing initiative that would undermine
efforts to implement the Guiding Principles,
which should remain the main focus of
international action in this field.
The decision of the Council prompted an
extended comment by Professor Ruggie in which
he reiterates his misgivings about a binding
instrument at this stage (Ruggie 2014). He
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points to the weak political mandate, passed not
with a majority but a plurality of votes in the
Council (China, in effect, while voting in favour,
entered a number of reservations); and the
excessively broad scale of the proposed Code:
‘… it encompasses too many complex areas of
national and international law for a single treaty
instrument to resolve across the full range of
internationally recognized human rights’. In
Professor Ruggie’s view, the way forward involves
the intergovernmental working group to bring
into its discussions civil society and business,
including individual firms from all regions;
carrying out basic research into relevant
precedents/models, needs and scope as a pre-
requisite of textual negotiations; and linking this
initiative to the Guiding Principles, with a strong
commitment to their implementation.
Professor Ruggie’s proposals reflect his overall
approach to these issues, which he has termed
‘principled pragmatism’ and defined as:
an unflinching commitment to the principle of
strengthening the promotion and protection
of human rights as it relates to business,
coupled with a pragmatic attachment to what
works best in creating change where it
matters most – in the daily lives of people
(Ruggie 2013: xlii–xliii).
We shall return to this notion in the next section.
4.3 ‘Bluewash’
The ‘bluewash’ issue has been discussed
particularly in connection with the Global
Compact (Bruno 2002). Critics of the initiative
have pointed to the potential danger of
companies joining the Compact solely for
purposes of acquiring public legitimacy, without
serious intention to implement the principles.
The first Global Compact Annual
Implementation Survey produced in 2007
seemed to lend some credibility to the fears. In
response to the question, ‘What are the reasons
for your organization’s participation in the
Global Compact?’, 63 per cent of the companies
mentioned ‘increase trust in company’ and
43 per cent indicated ‘improve public relations’.
The Compact has taken steps to address the
problem by introducing changes in the
monitoring requirements as well as a instituting
a set of Integrity Measures. On monitoring it
established a requirement that participating
companies issue an annual Communication on
Progress (COP), a public disclosure on progress
made in implementing the ten principles and in
supporting broader UN development goals. The
Integrity Measures, in turn, included:
z Limitations on the use of the Global
Compact’s name and logos to certain
authorised users and instances only;
z Sanctioning the failure to issue a COP with
changing a participant’s status to non-
communicating and eventually the expulsion
of the participant; and
z A procedure to deal with allegations of
systematic or egregious abuse of the Global
Compact’s overall aims and principles,
leading if necessary to the designation of the
company as non-communicating and to
expulsion.
By the end of 2012, the Compact had delisted
nearly 4,000 companies but, in the words of its
Executive Director, there was still a long way to
go dealing with ‘free riders who joined but had
no intention to stay engaged’ (Confino 2012; see
also Knudsen 2011).
A particularly contentious issue arises in
connection with the compliance by Global
Compact participant companies with the
WHO/UNICEF International Code of Marketing
of Breast-milk Substitutes. The International
Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) published in
2014 a report documenting 813 violations of the
Code by 27 companies in 81 countries between
January 2011 and December 2013 (IBFAN 2014).
Such violations have continued for many years
and, though challenged, have been upheld when
investigated by independent bodies. Six of the
companies named are either members of the
Compact, or owned by member companies, or
have subsidiaries which are members. They
include the two global leaders in the baby food
market, Nestlé and Danone.
There are also documented cases of pressures
from member companies, directly or through
their own governments, on countries not to adopt
the Code or to relax its application. A highly
publicised instance was the intervention of the
United States government vis-à-vis the
government of Vietnam in June 2012 urging the
rejection of a proposal to extend a ban on
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advertising formula milk products for babies
younger than 12 months to cover babies younger
than 24 months. The proposal was to be voted by
the Vietnamese National Assembly. IBFAN
managed to obtain, and published, a letter from
the US Embassy in Hanoi addressed to the
Chairman of the Assembly and to three
ministers, which read: ‘Several US companies
have contacted the US Embassy regarding their
serious concerns about this proposed prohibition
on advertising of formula milk products, which
could have a significant negative impact on their
business in Vietnam. We share their concerns.’15
According to IBFAN, one of the companies
involved in the lobbying was a member of the
Compact. To its credit, the Vietnamese National
Assembly nevertheless adopted the proposal
(Infact Canada 2012).
Particularly criticised have been the efforts by
Nestlé to argue that some of its products do not
fall within the scope of the Code as they are not
substitutes for, but supplements to,
breastfeeding.16 Such arguments have been
carefully considered and rejected by WHO and
UNICEF, who have stated and restated that
exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months is
best for all children – and sufficient in all but
exceptional cases. After six months,
supplementary feeding is needed, but this can be
in the form of solid foods with breastfeeding
continued, where possible well into the second
year. The life-saving importance of these
recommendations is that most poor families in
developing countries do not have the safe water
and other facilities needed for using breast milk
substitutes properly. Another big factor is the
immunological benefits which are passed from
mother to child through milk. In 2014, UNICEF
estimated that a breastfed child has six times
more chance of surviving to five years than a
bottle-fed child and The Lancet journal estimated
in 2013 that the deaths of 800,000 young
children could be prevented if optimal
breastfeeding was adopted (UNICEF n.d.b).
Accusations of ‘bluewashing’ have also been
made against UNDP’s Business Call to Action
among others by the respected development
NGO War on Want for including ‘corporations
that have been widely attacked for deepening
poverty and undermining human rights’ (War on
Want n.d.).
4.4 ‘Capture’
‘Capture’ refers to the fact that:
partnership with the UN not only provides
opportunities for business to pursue more
directly its own policy interests within the UN,
but the public purpose of the UN becomes
subverted if it begins to promote the policy
goals preferred by business when these are far
from universally approved (Zammit 2003: xxi).
The problem might in fact extend to the
relationship with NGOs and other organisations
in the light of the emphasis on ‘learning networks’
referred to above. To quote Zammit again:
Initiatives to encourage companies to improve
CSR include a range of actions… encourage
dialogue and ‘social learning’ among the
participants… For many of the protagonists,
these arrangements are considered the
optimal rather than second-best policy
solution as they embody the newly fashionable
notions of dialogue, responsibility, voluntary
interaction, and co-operation between
community and corporate interests…
However, these close relations between civil
society groups and the more powerful
government institutions and businesses carry
with them the risk of ‘capture’, that is, the
distortion of the priorities and practices of
NGOs and similar groups (Zammit 2003: 40).
The issue of ‘capture’ has been particularly
prominent in connection with work on technical
standards. Specifically, the Codex Alimentarius
has been accused of being unduly influenced by
corporate interests represented by trade
organisations which have observer status at the
Commission and its Committees (Verkerk n.d.).
By contrast, programmes that provide venues for
discussion and dialogue have, on the whole,
escaped this criticism. Specifically, UNCTAD’s
World Investment Forum has been generally
regarded as a serious effort to examine issues
concerning foreign direct investment and the
balance between the protection of foreign
investors and the right of governments to
regulate in the national interest.
Summing up and conclusions: Bringing business in, the
way forward
The preceding review of developments and issues
in UN efforts to engage the business sector in
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the achievement of its basic goals should have
alerted us to the complexities of the venture and
its many possible pitfalls. And yet the genie is
out of the bottle and the question is, what is the
way forward?
The analysis above identified various forms by
which the UN has sought business engagement.
While conceding that an evaluation of the
achievement of the ultimate goal of an inclusive
globalisation is highly problematic, given the
complex constellation of variables involved, the
discussion suggested that an evaluation of
activities and outputs was possible and that,
where it has been carried out, it has shown a
degree of progress. The question remains,
however, whether the activities and specific
outcomes are of the sort that, in the words of the
McKinsey report, support ‘the necessary and
sufficient conditions for making progress toward
the ultimate goal’ (McKinsey & Company 2004: 2).
The analysis also strongly suggested that claims
that bringing business into UN processes
amounts to a fundamental change in the mode of
governance of the organisation are exaggerated.
The UN remains an intergovernmental
organisation and governments – both from
developed and developing countries – are the
first custodians of that principle, as shown by the
brief account above of the process leading up to
the adoption of the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights.
Opening up the workings of the UN to non-state
actors, however, is a trend of the times, and will
continue. The presence of business in UN
processes, both as partner and as bearer of duties
and obligations, is very likely to increase. This
raises the vexed question of whether the UN
should issue legally binding injunctions or trust
business to self-regulate and comply voluntarily.
Quite apart from consideration of effectiveness, it
would seem that the political economy arguments
advanced by Professor Ruggie should carry the
day. The chances of an international convention
establishing binding obligations for business are
simply, at least in the short to medium term, not
high. In the circumstances, Professor Ruggie’s
approach, ‘principled pragmatism’, recommends
itself: go as far as possible in the direction of legal
obligation but without forcing the pace unduly.
Specifically, an area which appears promising in
this regard is that of remedies available to
individuals for violations of human rights
committed by business concerns. A resolution
mandating a consultative exploration of this issue
has already been adopted by consensus by the
Council on Human Rights.17
The preceding suggests that the question of non-
compliance and the related issue of ‘bluewashing’
are unlikely to be addressed by means of
sanctions. The way forward here is to reinforce
monitoring mechanisms and transparency. The
introduction of the Communication of Progress
and the Integrity Measures in the Global
Compact are an important step in this direction
and have already produced some visible results in
the form of delisting delinquent companies.
The issue of ‘capture’ is a particularly difficult
one. Without necessarily accepting all
denunciations, it seems apparent that in some
contexts business, especially TNCs, wield
disproportionate influence, even more when their
interests are supported by powerful governments.
Here there are two important ways forward: one
is participation of other non-state actors,
including NGOs, various parts of the UN itself,
international organisations, academic
institutions, labour unions, etc. They can perform
a useful function as watchdogs as well as provide
alternative voices. A second is building closer
links with regional and sub-regional organisations
which have in some cases adopted regulations of
TNCs and other business operations in areas
where the UN itself has been unable to act. A
case in point is the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2011).
Finally, the concept of the Global Compact as an
instance of network learning is promising as long
as it is kept in mind that what is at stake here is
not only a technical, problem-solving, process,
but that there are potential conflicts of interest
between government and business which will call
for political debate and decision in the
appropriate intergovernmental UN bodies.
All these suggestions, however, are based on
preliminary assessments made on the strength of
the incomplete and mostly anecdotal evidence
available. We still do not have systematic and
comprehensive empirical analyses on the profiles
of the ‘business’ engaged with the UN, or on the
way in which their role in global governance and
their incentives have changed as a result of UN
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engagement. More specifically, what have been
the effects of the various programmes in terms
of intermediate outcomes in the direction of the
ultimate goals? Can we identify the conditions
under which they are successful, and how do they
differ for different types of businesses? Has self-
regulation been effective in helping steer the
behaviour of business in the desired directions?
Has ‘bluewashing’ been a serious problem? To
what extent has business attempted to influence
UN policies and actions to further its own
interests? How has the presence of business
impacted on the governance mechanisms of the
UN and the shaping of UN processes?
The state of knowledge about the UN–business
relationship suggests, therefore, a rich and
complex research agenda. To tackle it is no doubt
a pre-requisite for further serious progress in the
effort to engage the business sector in the
pursuance of the goals of the UN.
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Notes
1 A point documented in detail in Tesner (2000).
2 NGO observers on similar bases are also
allowed by other UN bodies which are not
ECOSOC subsidiaries, such as the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), specialised agencies and treaty
bodies.
3 A textbook example is the negotiation of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the
World Trade Organization (WTO), where the
presence of pharmaceutical multinational
companies was very much in evidence
throughout the process (see Sell 2003). The
WTO is not a specialised agency of the UN
but as a member of the UN System Chief
Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) is
part of the broad UN system of institutions.
4 For a good discussion of many of the points
raised by this conceptualisation see Zammit
(2003). See also Utting (2000 and 2003).
5 They are: support and respect the protection
of internationally proclaimed human rights;
avoid complicity in human rights abuses;
uphold the freedom of association and the
right to collective bargaining; elimination of
compulsory labour; abolition of child labour;
elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation; a precautionary
approach to environmental challenges;
promote greater environmental responsibility;
encourage the development and diffusion of
environmentally friendly technologies; work
against corruption, including extortion and
bribery (United Nations Global Compact 2014). 
6 The UNDP also enters into partnership with
private companies in the course of its regular
technical cooperation activities. 
7 Mention should be made here of the
Partnerships for Sustainable Development, an
initiative launched at the Johannesburg World
Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002,
defined as ‘multi-stakeholder initiatives
voluntarily undertaken by Governments,
intergovernmental organizations, major
groups and others stakeholders to contribute
to the Implementation of inter-governmentally
agreed development goals and commitments,
as included in Agenda 21, the Johannesburg
Plan of Implementation, the Millennium
Declaration, the outcome document of the
United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development (Rio+20) entitled “The Future
We Want”, and the upcoming post-2015
sustainable development agenda’ (UN DESA
2014: 2). While these are not strictly UN
activities, they are registered with the United
Nations Commission on Sustainable
Development and in a few cases UN agencies
participate.
8 Another example worth mentioning in this
category is the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe Agricultural Quality
Standards (UNECE n.d.a). 
9 The evaluation further defines its more
narrow aim as assessing ‘the Compact’s
success in supporting the necessary and
sufficient conditions for making progress
toward the ultimate goal’.
10 This is an anonymous online survey which all
companies participating in the Compact are
invited to take. The response in 2012 – the last
one available – was 25 per cent. The Survey was
administered and analysed by the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania.
11 The point is sharply put by James Paul,
executive director of the Global Policy Forum
commenting on the Global Compact: ‘By
establishing this blue-chip minimalism, they
hope to avoid something that would be a more
serious (and effective) means of accountability/
regulation at the global level’ (cited in Turner
2004).
5 IDSB46.3 FortinJolly.qxd  07/05/2015  13:33  Page 55
12 For a detailed account see Ruggie (2013).
13 See Weissbrodt (2006); and NGO (2006) where
92 NGOs call on the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) ‘to take into
consideration the growing body of legal
jurisprudence and doctrine concerning the
direct applicability of international law to
private actors’ and ‘to make recommendations
about the means by which appropriate legal
standards might be elaborated, adopted and,
eventually, implemented’. 
14 Bolivia and Ecuador are not members of the
Council.
15 Available at www.infactcanada.ca/pdf/
vietnam-us-embassy-letter.pdf (accessed
15 December 2014).
16 For an assessment done by a private
consultancy firm that presents in some detail
Nestlé’s case, see Paceth (n.d.) Nestlé joined
the Global Compact in 2001 and is a founding
member of the Compact’s LEAD initiative,
defined as ‘a leadership platform comprising a
group of “champion” companies that support
UNGC participants in their efforts to achieve
higher levels of corporate sustainability
performance’ (Nestlé S.A. 2013: 41). 
17 UN Document A/HRC/26/L.1, Rev.1. 
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